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Economic reforms, industrialisation, urbanisation and migration since the 1980s have given 
rise to what is now often described as the ‘new working class’ in China (Tong 2012; Qiu 
2009; Qiu and Wang 2012: 159–192; Leung and So 2012: 84–104). But is there such a thing 
as a working class media culture, and if so, what shape and form does a working class media 
culture take? What are the political, social and economic contexts in which a working class 
media culture comes to exist? And finally, if there is such a thing as the working class media 
culture, then what is the relationship between class analysis and media studies in China, and 
indeed how should future research agendas be shaped by these concerns? This chapter 
addresses these questions: In the first part, I discuss the master-to-subaltern transformation in 
the cultural politics of identity construction and provide an outline of the main media and 
cultural forms and practices that are associated with the new working classes in contemporary 
China. In the second part, I consider the empirical, methodological and analytical 
implications of adopting a class analysis perspective, and in so doing, provide some thoughts 
on the shaping of media and communication studies as a field. I argue that, for the same 
reason that labour sociologists cannot agree on the level of class consciousness among 
China’s workers (Chan and Siu 2012: 105–132; Leung and So 2012: 84–104), it is difficult to 
generalise about the connection between new media and communication technologies and the 
level of workers’ class consciousness. At the same time, I suggest that although the 
development of a working class media culture is uneven and its contour somewhat unclear, 
its impact could be far reaching and its social-political implication is not to be dismissed. 
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This discussion cautions us against, on the one hand, an essentialist idea of a pure and 
authentic working class media culture, and on the other hand, a dismissive view about the 
long-term political, social and cultural impact of working class media practices. 
 
  
From Proletarian to Subaltern: Working Class Media Practices 
 
It is now widely agreed that three decades of economic reforms has transformed China from 
one of the most egalitarian societies in the world to one of the most unequal societies in Asia 
and the world (Sun and Guo 2013; Whyte 2010; Lee and Selden 2009; Zang 2008: 53–70; 
Davis and Wang 2009). The impact of socioeconomic stratification has been extensively 
documented in the work of sociologists, economists and political economists. The main 
beneficiaries and agents of the social economic growth in the decades of economic reforms 
since the early 1980s are ‘cadres, managers, and entrepreneurs’, or what have come to be 
described as China’s ‘new middle class’ (Goodman 2008: 24). In contrast, workers and 
peasants, once members of the ‘most progressive forces of history’, representing the ‘most 
advanced forces of production’, have lost their status as the most favoured social groups. 
‘There is no denying that large sections of the working class have lost their privilege and 
joined the new poor since losing their “iron rice bowl” and becoming detached from the 
CCP’s historical mission’ (Guo 2008: 40). The consequences of this process of class 
restructuring are indeed far reaching. Workers and peasants are now described as members of 
the ‘disadvantaged groups’ (ruoshi qunti). 
 
Profound social changes have forced the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to make necessary 
adjustments to its rhetoric on class discourses. Surveying the analyses of social restructuring 
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by China’s social scientists, Yingjie Guo identifies two crucial processes by which social 
classes are categorised and explained. The first is the deliberate evasion of class struggle 
discourse. This strategy resorts to acknowledging the reality of socioeconomic stratification 
in reform-era China but proposes the doctrine of social harmony as a strategy of managing 
class conflict. The second is the process by which intellectual work circumvents rather than 
raises class consciousness. With the class struggle discourse made inoperable, the entire 
society is now urged to look up to the middle classes as exemplary of preferred values, 
lifestyles and behaviours (Guo 2008: 51).  
 
The Chinese workers in the neoliberal era of capital accumulation are not a monolithic entity. 
Noticeable differences exist in terms of grievances, pattern of mobilisation and collective 
action, subjective identity, between rural migrant workers and state-enterprise workers, and 
between workers in private and joint venture factories in south China, and rust-belt state 
workers in north China (Lee 2007; Leung and So 2012: 84–104). However, across the board, 
in terms of media representations of the Chinese worker, we have witnessed dramatic shifts 
in narrative strategies, discursive positions and ideological agendas. The identity of the 
worker has changed, along with the political, social and economic meaning of work. 
‘Workers’, which once denoted dignity and ownership of the means of production, are now 
widely described as dagong individuals, denoting casual labourers for hire in the capitalist 
labour market. In the socialist era, workers engaged in labour (laodong), which gave them 
dignity, pride and moral legitimacy; now they are rural migrant workers (nong min gong, 
meaning peasant worker), who exist as cheap labour, which is either in excess or short supply, 
and who are in constant need of self-improvement in order to make themselves qualified for 
capitalist production (Yan 2008; Pun 2005; Sun 2009). Whereas in the socialist era they were 
the proletariat vanguards in possession of supreme moral leadership, they have become the 
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object of urban and middle-class sympathy and compassion. We now are confronted with a 
most uncomfortable and, to the CCP, inconvenient truth: the workers and peasants may have 
become the masters of socialism, but are now occupying the bottom of the social hierarchy. 
Workers, particularly rural migrants, are now often described as people from dicing (literally 
meaning ‘the very bottom of the rung’) and this description evokes a spatial metaphor of a 
vertically arranged socially hierarchy. Thus, in reality if not in rhetoric, and truer about some 
individuals than others, we can say that workers’ socioeconomic status has regressed to 
where it was before their historical fanshen. 
 
Literally meaning ‘turning over the body’, the term fanshen evokes a corporeal metaphor to 
connote the complete change of political identity, whereby the downtrodden have finally 
stood up to become speaking subjects. Fanshen therefore has the ‘extended meaning of 
casting off economic and political oppression and assuming full citizenship’ (Hershatter 2007: 
87). Made familiar to western scholars through William Hinton’s influential book of the same 
title, a documentary account of the revolution in a single Chinese village (Hinton 1997), the 
notion of fanshen draws on Mao’s famous logic that ‘where there is oppression, there will be 
rebellion’, and is essential to the successful mobilisation of class consciousness, a crucial 
dimension of the revolutionary cause (Cai 2010). What is noteworthy is that while the 
‘position reversal’ (fanshen) discourse was widely resonant with and widely used by workers 
and peasants in the socialist era, diceng, in contrast, is a term mostly used by urban middle 
class academic and cultural elites to describe those below them. For instance, novels and 
poetry about rural migrants, often written by migrants themselves, are described as diceng 
writings (diceng xiezuo) and diceng culture (diceng wenhua). In addition, those at the bottom 
rung are perceived to be morally inferior, lacking in civility, and ill equipped with the skills 
and knowledge necessary for China’s modernisation and integration into the global economy. 
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In the grand narrative of modernisation, the worker is no longer cast in the role of moral 
leadership; instead, he is often found wanting in ‘intellectual capability and personal quality’ 
(suzhi). In contrast to the discourse of dignity, the discourse of suzhi functions in the narrative 
of ‘elite modernist technologies’ (Jacka 2006: 56) as both an instrument of neoliberal 
governmentality and a technology of the self (Yan 2008; Anagnost 2004: 189–208). 
Eschewing the Marxist notion of class in terms of the relations of production, suzhi codes the 
class-based difference between rural migrants and the urban middle class. Furthermore, suzhi 
‘works ideologically as a regime of representation through which subjects recognise their 
positions within the larger social order’ (Anagnost 2004: page number). Given that migrants 
construct their identities and understand their experience in reaction to and within the 
framework of state and popular discourses (Jacka 2006; Sun 2009; Yan 2008), the experience 
of migrants and the formation of migrants’ subject positions must be understood within the 
context of their differentiated levels of acceptance of and identification with dominant 
discourses, which have inevitably cast the rural migrant as being in need of suzhi 
development (Yan 2008). The worker is no longer a morally righteous proletariat; instead, he 
is a shadowy figure who moves across the increasingly ‘polysemic and hybrid’ discursive 
universe of post-Mao China, where ‘official propaganda, middle-class social reformist 
sensibilities, and popular concerns for hot social issues all jostle to be heard’ (Zhao 2008). As 
a social identity that is increasingly subject to myriad discursively and visually mediated 
configurations, the migrant worker exists in the contested and fraught space between the 
government’s tokenistic representation, market-driven urban tales inundating the popular 
culture sector, independent, alternative, or underground documentaries on the transnational 
art circuits, and various forms of cultural activism engaged in by Non-Governmental 
Organisation (NGO) workers and their intellectual allies. In addition, all these ideological 
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sites must decide on the extent to which they draw on a socialist cultural politics of the 
working class.  
 
Widespread socioeconomic stratification has not only led to the marginalisation of the 
workers in a material sense, it has also given rise to the ‘culture of inequality’ (Sun 2013a: 
page number), evidenced in the hegemonic language of the urban, consumer-oriented middle 
class, along with the marginalisation of workers’ and peasants’ voices. In other words, if the 
proletariat cultural practices shifted from the tactics of the resistance of the weak to assume 
the position of the powerful in the revolutionary narratives (Cai 2010), such power dynamics 
have largely been reversed in the reform era. However, this does not mean that workers and 
peasants in the revolutionary discourse spoke their own language; in fact, they were using the 
vocabulary provided by the state, and their proletariat speech acts were sponsored and 
organised by the state. Rather than seeing this state-people relationship as that of top-down 
indoctrination, Hershatter points to a mutually appropriative dynamic, whereby the people 
were able to borrow the official language to make sense of their own past experience of 
exploitation and subjugation. For Hershatter, as well as literary critic Xiang Cai, the real 
failure of a socialist proletariat culture is due not so much to the imposition of an official 
language of class domination and class struggle onto the people. Rather, it is the tendency of 
the official language, particularly during the Cultural Revolution, to become increasingly 
‘homogenising’, ‘unilinear’, caricaturised, falsified and ‘overblown’ (Hershatter 1993: 108).  
 
Nor does this mean that Chinese workers in the neoliberal labour regime are resigned to 
returning to their position prior to the revolution. In a wide range of ideological spaces and 
discursive sites, and in different shapes and forms, workers again assume the pre-
revolutionary position of resistance and rebellion, albeit in a much more technologised and 
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mediatised form. Workers’ media practices demonstrate wildly varied levels of agency and 
political consciousness. They range from opportunistic engagement with the mainstream 
media for purposes of protecting or defending workers’ rights and interests, to active 
participation in media activism aimed at productive alternative, even oppositional discourses. 
For instance, staring at the hegemonic power of the mainstream media, aggrieved migrant 
workers often make the ‘choiceless choice’ of threatening to jump from tall buildings on 
construction sites in order to force management to pay wages owed to them. Workers’ 
decisions to insert themselves into media spectacles by staging ‘extreme actions’ testifies to 
workers’ understanding of how to exploit media logic, but at the same time they are acutely 
aware that the effectiveness of their tactics are subject to the vagaries of politics (Sun 2012a). 
These media spectacles, as well as workers’ involvement in them, highlight the David-versus-
Goliath power imbalance that marks worker versus state/capital relations, as well as the 
complexity of the structure-versus-agency dialectic. 
 
Workers’ media practice also takes the form of adopting new media and communication 
technologies to produce alternative materials as testimonials to work conditions, labour 
disputes, and the everyday reality of marginalisation (Xing 2012: 63–82). For instance, 
migrant workers have become increasingly savvy with the use of new media technologies to 
protect their rights and publicise individual experiences of injustice, including work-place 
injuries, failure to receive wages and unacceptable working and living standards (Tong 2012). 
Qiu (2009) refers to these incidents as ‘new media events’. Contrasting them with televised 
events, rituals and ceremonies, which are sleek in presentation, grand in scale and often take 
place in important spaces, Qiu argues that these media practices, enabled by the internet and 
new media technologies, nevertheless have the capacity to raise public awareness and effect 
real social change, even though they are small in scale.  
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Worker activists also engage in various forms of creative practice, such as dagong poetry and 
fiction. Whereas one could be forgiven for thinking that dagong life in the industrial 
heartland, notorious for its low pay, high levels of alienation and punishing effects on the 
body and soul, is hardly the ideal stuff for poetry, the truth is that long work hours and lack of 
tertiary education has not stopped many literary minded workers from creating poetry for self 
expression. For many worker-poets, writing poems is no longer an idle pursuit. It is about 
finding meaning and purpose in an otherwise meaningless existence (Sun 2012b). Many lines 
from dagong poetry, for instance, have been transformed into lyrics by activist songwriters 
and performers, enabling them to be ‘read’ and performed in a variety of formats. Sun Heng, 
a well known worker-singer and songwriter from the New Worker Art and Cultural Festival 
in Picun, rural Beijing, regularly puts music to dagong poems and performs them for migrant 
worker audiences. Also, lines from dagong poetry are often chosen to accompany the visual 
presentations, installations and exhibitions showcasing the work and living conditions of 
workers, leading to a range of highly dispersed and unpredictable modes of distribution, 
available to both workers and urban consumers. Finally, most worker-poets utilise online 
spaces, particularly blogs, to publish their work and engage in dialogue with readers (Sun 
2012c). This approach allows these writers to bypass the conventional institution of 
publishing. At the same time, the online reputation of some of these writers has led to book 
contracts with more traditional publishers (Sun 2013b). 
 
Both dagong poetry and dagong literature seek to create alternative spaces where workers’ 
suffering and experiences with social and economic injustice and exploitation can be narrated. 
In doing so, they effectively create a new space — albeit much more mediatised and in many 
cases virtual — to act out the new proletariat speech act of ‘speaking bitterness’. The 
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noticeable difference with its socialist antecedent is that rather than ‘speaking bitterness of 
the past and savouring the current sweetness’ (yiku sitian), these new, mediatised and 
technologically enabled genres of speaking bitterness are records of the bitterness and 
suffering here and now. Although many worker-poets and worker-novelists have left the 
assembly line in the factory to work in ‘white-collar’ jobs, some — especially those 
connected with labour NGOs — make a point of identifying themselves as dagong writers, 
and see it as their mission to advocate for workers’ interests and class positions.  
 
Migrant workers write blogs on dagong lives, and activists and leaders from the worker 
community effectively use weibo (a microblogging platform similar to Twitter) to inform, 
mobilise, organise and coordinate collective actions against capitalist management (Qiu 2012: 
173–189; also see Willnat, Wei and Martin in this volume). Other activists produce visual 
materials, including videos, documentaries and photography for the primary purpose of 
raising awareness among the wider community, as well as class consciousness among the 
workers. Although these grassroots media practices can hardly compete with mainstream 
media in terms of the scale of production and level of exposure, they nevertheless represent 
some nascent media forms and practices that have been made possible by the advent of 
digital visual technologies and online spaces (Sun 2012d: 83–100; Sun 2012e). It has been 
observed that with the exceptionally high level of uptake of mobile phones and social media 
platforms such as QQ (Chinese version of Skype) by rural migrant workers, engagement in 
new media practices has become an integral aspect of the very fabric of the everyday 
experience of the worker, especially workers that belong to the younger generation (Qiu 
2009). In other words, workers’ media practices should no longer be considered as external to 
workers’ socioeconomic experience as industrial labourers. They are part of the same 
experience. 
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This account of the media practices favoured by workers is admittedly sketchy. Qiu and 
Wang’s comparison (2012: 159–192) between the workers’ cultural spaces of rural migrants 
in Beijing and state workers in Anshan points to divergence between rural migrant workers 
and state workers in terms of cultural practices and media strategies. At one end of the 
spectrum, witnessing media practices favoured by migrant workers which do not prima facie 
present themselves as active acts of opposition, one can be forgiven for thinking that mobile 
technologies, online technologies and social media function more as ‘opium’, diverting 
workers’ attention to mundane pursuits instead of making commitments to political and social 
causes of ‘liberation’ (Tong 2012). In some cases, rather than a tool of empowerment, the 
mobile phones belonging to rural migrant workers can be used by their employers for 
purposes of control and micro-surveillance (Wallis 2013). Like their urban consumer 
counterparts, migrant workers spend much time in internet cafés and on their personal 
computers and mobile phones playing games and reading fantasy novels or ‘how to succeed’ 
self-help books. They also, like their urban counterparts, enthusiastically use camera phones 
to create a digital form of ‘autobiography’ and ‘self-portraiture’ (or ‘selfie’), with meticulous 
attention to and reflection on the body (Gai 2009: 199–202). Rural migrant women working 
in the service sector in Beijing have been found to use their phone-cameras to produce 
images that make sense of their displacement and to document the transformations in their 
lives (Wallis 2013). At the other end of the spectrum, citing the examples of factory workers 
using mobile phones, blogging and social media in successful organisation of strikes, 
collective actions, and other interests-protecting activities, one is tempted to subscribe to a 
more hopeful view of empowerment of the worker afforded by new media technologies (Qiu 
2012: 173–189). 
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Working Class Media Cultures: Implications for Future Research  
 
So far, this discussion has traced the disappearance of the master-of-the-nation discourse and 
the subjectification of proletariat subjectivity in media and cultural expressions. It has also 
outlined a range of media and cultural forms, practices and content which bear the trademark 
of the oppressed, marginal and subaltern. It shows that workers, formerly the rulers and 
masters of the nation, have once again taken up the ‘weapons of the weak’. At the same time, 
the discussion also illuminates a number of themes that are worth bearing in mind in future 
research. First, working class media forms and practices exist only in response to and in 
juxtaposition with mainstream media, including both official and commercial media. Second, 
the cultural politics of identity construction engaged in by both the ideological mainstream 
and the working classes in contemporary China are necessarily played out by referencing — 
critically, appropriatively and even ironically — its socialist antecedents. Third, the media 
forms and practices favoured by the working classes in the state sanctioned neoliberal market 
economy are shaped by new media and communication technologies. 
 
In so far as the construction of the worker’s identity is concerned, this is a shift from a 
proletarian to subaltern identity. While the former aims to reinforce the idea of workers as 
members of the most progressive social forces whose values, beliefs and behaviours are to be 
emulated by the less progressive social classes, such as the intellectuals, the technocrats and 
the bourgeoisie, the latter has the main purpose of resisting hegemony and creating 
alternative spaces to the mainstream, while simultaneously gaining voice, visibility and 
recognition. As Xinyu Lü, a Marxist scholar at Fudan University, Shanghai, observes sharply, 
Chinese workers and peasants, who used to be the political and moral backbone of socialist 
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China, so large in number and so indispensable to its revolutionary history, have well and 
truly become the ‘subaltern’ class in the Chinese contemporary polity (quoted in Zhao 2010a: 
page number). 
 
This reallocation of discursive resources to accommodate the interests of the urban middle 
class is reflected in the media practices of the ideological mainstream, which in turn 
predetermines the research focus of media and communication studies. For instance, there is 
a surfeit of research interest in China’s transnational, urban middle class as producers, 
intended consumers, subject matter and beneficiaries of economic reform. These include, for 
instance, media’s role in perpetuating the values and lifestyles of urban, middle class 
consumers, discussions on the prospect of a bourgeois public sphere or civic society brought 
about by the use of digital, social media among the urban middle class and of course, China’s 
going-out ambitions and its soft power agenda. Furthermore, there seems to be a tendency to 
engage in research in these areas as if they were discrete and unconnected with the pressing 
issue of socioeconomic stratification in China. 
 
Yet, to demonstrate the hidden connection between these lines of inquiry and the issue of 
class inequality is precisely what makes research in Chinese media studies empirically 
significant. As Chinese media and communication scholar Zhengrong Hu observes one has to 
wonder, as China goes full-steam ahead with its efforts to present its voice and image to the 
world, how this unified and positive voice and image — as a correction to the excessively 
western portrayals of China — can possibly incorporate the diverse interests of various social 
classes (Hu and Ji 2012: 32–37). Similarly, Yuezhi Zhao argues that class analysis is central 
to our understanding of the media and cultural sector, since this sector is not only the site of 
production and economic exchange, it is also the means of social organisation and the site of 
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subjectivity formation (Zhao 2008: 76). For this reason, she argues that media and 
communication scholars must explore the ways in which transnational capital and domestic 
forces intersect to shape China’s communication sector (Zhao 2008: 18). At the same time, 
she also stresses the importance of studying how the media and communication sector shapes 
the subjectivity and class consciousness of China’s highly segmented working class, arguing 
forcefully that the ‘rise of China’ cannot possibly be sustained in the long run without the rise 
of China’s lower social classes (Zhao 2010b: 544–551).  
 
Despite the fundamental difference in the ways in which workers and peasants are 
represented in the two historical eras, there is little attempt to show how a retrospective 
review of the socialist period can be productively informed by and benefit from the hindsight 
of the ensuring era, which has witnessed economic reforms, market liberalisation, the 
reappearance of class conflicts in social life, and the disappearance of the theme of class 
struggle in official discourses. Xiang Cai’s groundbreaking book, Revolution/Narrative 
(2010), a deconstructive reading of major literary works in the period of 1949–1966, is a 
conspicuous exception. In this book, Cai examines in exceptionally fine-grained manner the 
discursive construction of the worker identity, the meaning of labour and purposes of the 
industrial modernisation in the socialist regime of truth. But such attempts have been limited 
to literature. In the field of media and communication studies, in comparison with the 
emerging body of work on the media’s coverage of workers in the reform era and workers’ 
activist media practices (both of which inform the discussion of this chapter so far), there is 
little work on the question of how workers, labour and industrial work are represented in 
mass media in the three decades prior to the start of the economic reforms. For instance, 
although we now have some knowledge of how urban commercial cinema constructs 
marginal social identities such as rural migrant workers (Sun 2012f), in comparison, we know 
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little of how films set in factories in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s (and there are quite a few) 
negotiate the relationship between workers, party leaders, and technical experts. In addition, 
while we have witnessed a flourishing of scholarship on the New Documentary Movement in 
China which focuses on rural migrants, industrial workers, gays and lesbians and other 
marginal identities such as HIV victims (e.g. Berry et al. 2010; also see Cao in this volume), 
how its predecessor, the ‘special topic’ documentary (Lu 2003), constructs workers and the 
significance of their labour against the background of national self-reliance and socialist 
modernity is relatively unclear. Similarly, we know that some young technology-savvy 
workers, equipped with digital camera phones, have taken up amateur photography as a way 
to document their work and their lives, and in doing so generate an invaluable visual source 
from which to understand the class experience of this social group which is large in size yet 
seriously under-represented in mainstream visual culture (Sun 2012e). Interestingly, this 
research also indicates that in terms of aesthetics and style of representation, some of these 
self-representations seem either reminiscent of, or consciously evoking the visual idiom from 
the revolutionary representations. Yet to establish the historical continuity and disjuncture 
between the two eras calls for a more systematic analysis of news photos as a historically 
specific signifying practice. How, for instance, did news values in socialist journalism, 
including photojournalism, inform news media’s coverage of workers’ activities and 
achievements in publications such as the People’s Daily and the Worker’s Daily?   
 
Knowing answers to these empirical questions is a matter of urgent intellectual and political 
concern for a number of reasons. Firstly, socialist media relied heavily on visual technologies, 
particularly in the form of news photos, propaganda documentaries and films for purposes of 
mass mobilisation, moral education and political propaganda. In comparison with literature, 
which required some levels of literacy, or art, which was accessible to only the more cultured 
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echelon of society, visual media representations such as the newspapers, special topic 
newsreels and films offered more direct ways of reaching mass audiences. Screening 
propaganda films, documentaries and special newsreels was a crucial means of political 
socialisation through the organisational mechanism of the workplace and the school. For this 
reason, leaving a vast discursive site largely unexamined means not knowing how visual 
media contributed to the socialist legacy of proletariat culture. Secondly, many of the 
contemporary cultural practices engaged in by subaltern groups adopt or appropriate the 
language of earlier socialist cultural forms and practices. They look to socialist cultural 
expressions as sources of political, moral and cultural repertoires (Xing 2012: 63–82). Hence 
in order to understand fully both the cultural politics of the workers’ current cultural struggles 
and the prospect of their cultural struggle, it is important to revisit historical practices by 
situating them in their particular historical context, as well as through the retrospective lens 
of the radically transformed social, economic and political reality of today. It is precisely for 
this reason that Yuezhi Zhao issues a clarion call for media and communication scholars to 
‘re-root the area in history’, so that we become more ‘mindful of China’s revolutionary 
history and the ways this history casts a long shadow over today’s reality’ (Zhao 2009: 177).  
 
Finally, but not least importantly, a long-range prospect of the working classes’ social destiny 
is unlikely to emerge unless we consider the metamorphosis of the social construction of 
class experience from the socialist to the current neoliberal era of capital accumulation. In the 
introduction to his book The Long Revolution, Raymond Williams (1971) speaks of a 
‘cultural revolution’ as the revolution of the third kind, following the democratic and 
industrial revolutions. The cultural revolution, argues Williams, is a particularly ‘long 
revolution’, and is the ‘most difficult to interpret’. In the same way that, as Williams (1971: 
12) argues, ‘we cannot understand the process of change in which we are involved if we limit 
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ourselves to thinking of the democratic, industrial, and cultural revolutions are separate 
processes’, we cannot understand the process of change in the long revolution if we limit 
ourselves to thinking of workers’ media and cultural practices in historically discrete or 
isolated terms. Sociologists of labour also caution against taking an ahistorical perspective, 
given that the formation of class, the emergence of class consciousness, labour movements 
and social movements are believed to take a much longer time span than two or three decades 
to take full shape (Chan and Siu 2012: 105–132). 
 
There are of course conceptual and methodological implications for pursuing this line of 
inquiry regarding the relationship between class analysis and media studies. It requires us to 
go beyond the framework of propaganda, which so far has dominated our understanding of 
the socialist mass media, with its preoccupation with the issue of political control, censorship 
and ideological indoctrination. Also, this requires us to reconsider the role of the Chinese 
state in the formation of proletariat cultural legacies. As Zhao (2009: 177) explains, this calls 
for a ‘recognition of the Chinese state as one forged in the anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist 
social revolution, with a historically grounded popular base of legitimacy, not as an absolutist 
state which the European bourgeois fought against historically’. It requires media scholars to 
take a cultural-political approach to address a specific concern with questions of media forms 
and media practices, including delving into the cultural politics of the proletariat worker 
identity, in a range of media forms whose discursive and visual mediation of the worker 
identity has so far largely eluded scholarship. It involves asking important questions, such as 
who has access to the means of producing, shaping and perpetuating the political lingua 
franca; what signifying practices are dominant in a given space and time; and what are the 
origins of the discursive power to name, label and define working class identities. It also 
explores the common narrative forms, tropes and strategies adopted to transform a group’s 
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perspectives into common knowledge that ‘we’ all share, as well as the process by which 
private and personal longings, dreams and desires become ‘public allegories’, making certain 
social groups’ desires and longings more legitimate than others (Rofel 2007). 
 
Given the master-to-subaltern identity transformation of the working classes, the question of 
how media and communication research can productively engage with the notion of 
subalternity must be put on the agenda. Developed most prominently in Indian and Latin 
American societies, and mostly in the contexts of race and ethnicity, subaltern analysis is 
concerned with making the invisible visible and giving voice to subalterns ‘who cannot 
speak’. It is becoming an increasingly attractive approach among those concerned with issues 
of agency, voice and identity in China, albeit in radically different social contexts (Pun 2005; 
Yan 2008). In her research on prostitution in Shanghai in the early twentieth century, China 
historian Gail Hershatter observes that the theorisation of subalternity, although developed in 
the colonial history of South Asia, can be productively engaged to explore relations of 
subjugation of the oppressed people at the intersection of gender, class and the Chinese state. 
Hershatter rightly cautions us, however, that any attempt to engage with the concept of 
subalternity must start by appreciating its ‘multiple’ and ‘relational’ nature. For the same 
reason that the Indian nationalist elites and subaltern politics were intertwined and hence the 
question of who is a ‘subaltern’ is relational (Guha and Spivak 1988), tracing the shift from 
what Paul Clark (2008: 142) calls the ‘proletarian nobility’ to subalternity in the Chinese 
context must also take into account a wide range of complicating factors, including the 
sometimes convergent and other times divergent interests of the state, NGOs, the urban 
middle class, transnational intellectuals and Chinese workers. Rather than take the presence 
or existence of subalternity as given, we must ‘take seriously the categories through which 
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historical subjects make meaning of their own experience, the degree to which subalterns 
both legitimate and subvert hegemonic categories’ (Hershatter 1993: 106). 
 
In the case of the Chinese rural migrant worker as a subaltern figure, two things are 
particularly worthy of note and further inquiry. The first relates to the issue of subaltern 
position. Comparing various cohorts of factory workers in China convinces Rofel (1999: 98) 
that the identity of the subaltern selves is not ‘intrinsic in the relations of production’. For this 
reason, rather than accepting claims of subalternity as given, we must ask questions about 
how subalternity is ‘culturally produced, embraced, performed, challenged, and denied’ 
(Rofel 1999: 98). This, argues Rofel, does not mean marginalised social groups such as 
China’s workers and peasants stand outside of and against power. Instead, one must ask how 
subaltern practices are ‘lodged within fields of power and knowledge’ (p.168). This caution is 
particularly worth heeding, given that the migrant labouring body, useful to the market for its 
capacity to produce surplus value, has also become a field of intense symbolic struggle 
between various class positions. The state, capital, international NGOs and transnational 
cultural elites all want to speak on behalf of China’s rural migrant workers. Yet, at the same 
time we cannot assume that all rural migrants identify with the position of subalternity. In 
fact, the issue of position in these diverse constructions is necessarily couched in ambiguous, 
complex and contradictory terms. Given this, it is essential to identify ways in which rural 
migrants position themselves in relation to state propaganda, middle class consumers, media 
professionals and cultural elites, as well as the ways migrant worker positions are expressed 
and managed in relation to one another within the worker cohort, including urban workers in 
state enterprises, currently laid-off factory workers now subsisting on welfare, and rural 
migrant workers as dagong individuals. 
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The second relates to the issue of subaltern movement and activism. As this discussion has 
delineated, the shift from the master to the subaltern position is by no means merely 
rhetorical and its impact cannot be overestimated. As the Marxist discourses of the 
proletarian class were abandoned in favour of neoliberal discourse of individual improvement, 
workers have been robbed of the power to effectively transform their own situation (Carrillo 
and Goodman 2012: 10–26). In other words, while some scholars and journalists outside 
China invest their hope for political change in China’s newly emerging working class, they 
may to some extent have overlooked the fact that this class has been so disempowered that 
their class position has more or less reverted back to the pre-revolutionary status quo. If this 
is a case of history repeating itself, we are indeed compelled to consider yet again the politics 
and the tactics of the weak, and subaltern’s strategies of ‘talking back’ to the ‘colonial 
master’. In the workers’ efforts to talk back to and negotiate relationships with such ‘colonial 
masters’, various types of media and cultural activism have arisen, and distinct working class 
media cultures are formed in this process of negotiation and struggle. To media studies 
scholars interested in the relationship between class and media, these no doubt present 
themselves as the most pertinent lines of inquiry. 
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